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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the STATE OF UTAH
STANFORD B. PETERSEN and CAROL
A. PETERSEN, his wife
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
VS.

lNTERMOUNTAIN CAPITAL CORPORATION,
Defendant-Respondent.
D. SPENCER NILSON,

Case No.

12984

Plaintiff,

vs.

STANFORD B. PETERSEN, et. al.,
Defendant.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action for breach of an agreement to loan
$20,000 within one year from the date of the agreement
which was consolidated with an action between the same
parties for foreclosure of a note and mortgage. This latter
action was treated as a counterclaim.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
The lower court dismissed the action for breach upon
its merits based upon findings and conclusions that specific
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performance had beep_ waived, that performance was
prevented and that the parties had entered an accord and
satisfaction. The court further awarded a decree foreclos.
ing the note and mortgage.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The judgment dismissing the action for breach should
be reversed with instructions to determine the amount of
damages resulting from the breach and offsetting the
amount due under the note and mortgage.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 22, 1966 the plaintiffs, Stanford B. Petersen and Carol A. Petersen (hereinafter called Petersen),
entered into a written agreement (Exh. 8-P) with defendant, Intermountain Capital Corporation (hereinafter
called ICC), under which Petersen exchanged his interest
in a motel for certain property located in Casper, Wyoming (hereinafter called the Wyoming property) and
$30,000.00. The agreement further provided that ICC was
to loan Petersen $20,000 within one year from the date of
the agreement, the time within that year to be determined
by ICC, to be repaid in three annual installments with
nine percent interest and to be secured by a mortgage on
the Wyoming property. (Para. 5, Exh. 8-P). The agreement
also provided that time was "of the essence of this agree·
ment" and that it "may not be altered or amended except
by written agreement executed by all of the parties."
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Petersen was in need of money during the entire year
of the agreement and thereafter and John Whiteley, the
president and manager of ICC, knew of his need for
money (R. 43-44, 69, 71). The purpose of this loan provision
in the agreement was to take care of some pressing financial obligations of Petersen (R. 43-44). Petersen contacted
·whiteley several times during the year and regularly
after the year expired to obtain the funds ICC had agreed
to loan. Each time Whiteley responded that they didn't
have the funds to make the loan. Finally, on April 5, 1967,
a formal demand letter (Exh. 9-P) was sent to ICC by
Petersen's attorney threatening legal action if the loan
was not made. After receiving the letter Whiteley went
to Petersen's home and again said he couldn't make the
loan because he didn't have the money. (R. 48).
Petersen had already lost a dairy equipment business
because of his lack of funds (R. 49) and had numerous
obligations to meet in connection with that business. He
had previously, in October of 1966, contracted to sell the
Wyoming property to James S. Milliron for $67,200.00
unrler a Uniform Real Estate Contract containing the
standard provision allowing the Seller to "secure, execute
and maintain loans secured by said property of not to
exceed the then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearinterest at the rate of not to exceed six percent." The
balance due on the contract was $50,200.00 and it would
have had a balance far in excess of the $20,000.00 that ICC
was to loan. Therefore, there was still adequate security
for the loan. Milliron, the Buyer under the Uniform Real
Estate Contract, knew of Petersen's need to mortgage the
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property to ICC and had no objection thereto (R. 49 65).
Because of Petersen's immediate need for funds and ICC's
failure to loan it to him as agreed, he approached Milliron
about paying the contract off in cash for a discount. An
agreement was signed by Petersen and Milliron on May 5,
1967 by which the $50,200.00 balance on the contract was
discounted to $30,900.00 cash. With these funds Petersen
was able to pay his pressing obligations but he suffered a
loss of $19,300.00 in order to do so. Had ICC honored the
agreement to loan $20,000.00, Petersen would not have
discounted this contract (R. 60) and he would have mortgaged the Wyoming property to ICC in spite of the contract to Milliron (R. 67).
On May 12, 1967, soon after discounting this contract
to Milliron, Petersen went to see Whiteley again. \Vhiteley
then agreed to have ICC lend $5000.00 to Petersen to be
secured by a mortgage on a home on Camino Way in Salt
Lake City. No request was made that the Wyoming property be used as security for this loan. (R. 59, 62-63). At the
time of this loan Petersen requested that ICC make the
loan of the entire $20,000.00 but Whiteley again refused.
Several times following the $5,000.00 loan, Petersen asked
Whiteley about the additional $15,000.00. Each time
Whiteley said he needed more time to get the other
$15,000.00 (R. 63, 72-73).
The $5,000.00 loan was due in 60 days but was not

paid. ICC didn't ask for any payment because Whiteley
realized they had been slow in loaning the money. Much
later ICC's auditor sent a request to Petersen to confirm
the balance due on the loan. Petersen responded that he

felt he had been damaged by ICC's breach and that the

would bl'.! offset against the damages suffered. No
:1.'urther action was taken until July 3, 1969 when Petersen
ff!ed this action for breach of the agreement of January
22,. 1966. IGC answered the complaint and on August 20,
1971 assigned its $5,000.00 note and mortgage to D.
Spencer Nilson. Nilson commenced a foreclosure action on
December 20, 1971. Petersen filed an Answer and Counterclaim asserting that Nilson was not a holder in due course
and was therefore subject to all defenses and claims
against ICC and asking that the two actions be consolidated for trial. The lower court ordered the cases to be
consolidated for trial and at the trial ICC and Nilson
admitted that Nilson was not a holder in due course and
that the case could be handled as a claim and counterclaim between Petersen and ICC (R. 35, 41-42). At the trial
there was substantial evidence of loss to Petersen.
Joa;1

ARGUMENT
I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE LOAN OF $5,000.00 BY ICC TO PETERSEN ON
MAY 12, 1967 WAS AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
ICC has claimed in this action that the $5,000.00 loan
was an accord and satisfaction with respect to its original
obligation to loan $20,000.00. Yet, the phrase "accord and
satisfaction" was never used by the parties at any time.
It is important, therefore, to determine the definition of
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the phrase. This court, in Browning v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc. of the U.S., 94 Utah 532, 72 P. 2d 1060
(1937), reh. den .. 94 Utah 570, 80 P. 2d 348 (1938), has stated
at 1068:
An accord is an agreement between parties,
one to give or perform, the other to receive or accept, such agreed payment or performance in satisfaction of a claim. The "satisfaction" is the consumation of such agreement. There must be
consideration for the agreement. Settlement of an
unliquidated or disputed claim where the parties
are apart in good faith presents such consideration.
Where the claim is definite and no dispute but an
admittance of its owing, the agreement to take. a
lesser amount even followed by satisfaction is not
good unless attended by some consideration. In
this case we do not see the elements· of an accord
and satisfaction. True, there was a claim. It was
filed and paid in accordance with demand with no
dispute. If a doctor sends me a bill for $20.00 when
it should have been $30.00 and I pay it, it is not an
accord and satisfaction. It is merely a payment of
less than I owe.
In this case there is no evidence of an agreement (that
is-offer, acceptance and consideration) between ICC and
Petersen to perform and accept anything different from
their original agreement. There was no written agreement to accept the $5,000.00 loan in complete satisfaction
of the obligation to lend $20,000.00. In fact the only testimony in the record indicates a positive intention of both
parties that the original $20,000.00 was to be made in the
future. Petersen's testimony on cross-examination was as
follows from Page 63 of the record:
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"Q At the time of the $5,000.00 loan did you not ask
him about the other $15,000.00?
A. I asked him about the whole $20,000.00. I says,
'Can you loan me the $20,000.00?' And he says,
'No.'
Q. All right. So he came up with $5,000.00, is that
correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And did you ask him about the additional fifteen periodically after that?
A. You say I asked him about the fifteen?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes, about a month later I asked him if he could
still come up with the $20,000.00."
Whiteley's testimony on direct examination was as follows from Pages 71-73 of the record:
"A. After April 5th. We sat in his dining room and
discussed. this, and he was very nice about this,
and he said, •you have got to get me something
just about as fast as you can and I need it badly,
and this is why I have gone to the attorney.'
And I said, 'What is the least that you could
get by with until we can do something better?'
And he said, 1 Well, I really need $5,000.00.'
And I said, 'Then we will see that you get at
least $5,000.00. Give me a few days to work on
it and we will certainly come up with that much.'
Q. And did you?
A. We did.
Q. Did he say anything about this would solve his
problem?
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A. He indicatt~d at his home a day or two after we
got the letter that the $5,000.00 would solve his
problem at that time, and that we could take
more time on the balance. Then when we gave
him the check he said, 'Thanks, you have saved
my life.'
Q. This was on May 12th'?
A. Right.
Q. 1967? Were there other conversations after that
time with Mr. Petersen concerning trying to
get another $15,000.00 for him'?
A. Yes, several times. I would get him on the
phone or he would drop into the office, or he had
a travel agency on Second South, I would drop
in there to talk to him, and he would say, 'Are
you ready on the other $15,000.00?'
Q. All right. And what would you respond?
A. And I said, 'Well, we would· like a little more
time. We are trying to get you that money and
will if we can.'
And he said, 'Fine. Let me know when you can.' "

This is the only evidence in the record bearing
on the question of accord and satisfaction. "What is the
least that you could get by with until we can do something
better" and "we could take more time on the balance"
certainly negates any claim of accord and satisfaction.
And the repeated inquiries concerning the other $15,000.00
and requests for "a little more time" recognizes that the
original obligation was still considered binding by both
parties. Furthermore, no consideration was given by ICC
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to support a new agreement and there was no dispute
about the amount or terms of the obligation the settlement of which would constitute consideration. Therefore,
neither the facts nor the law support a finding of accord
and satisfaction.
This case is similar to Bennett v. Robinson's Medical
Afart, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P. 2d 761 (1966), where this
court held that acceptance of a check marked "payment in
full of the account stated below" was not an accord and
satisfaction. The court stated at 764:
"Plaintiff testified that upon receipt of the check
he went to the Defendants and discussed the matter, telling them that he did not regard it as payment in full and the dispute between the parties
over the matter is what precipitated this lawsuit.
He was unquestionably entitled to the money he
did receive; and the dispute was as to whether he
had more coming. The dispute negates any accord.... "
Likewise, Petersen accepted the $5,000.00 loan, although
there was no indication that it was "payment in full." The
conversations between Petersen and Whiteley show that
both of them recognized that the original agreement was
still to be performe<l. The failure to perform that agreement caused the filing of this lawsuit by Petersen. He was
unquestionably entitled to the $5,000.00 loan he received
(though he was entitled to more favorable terms); the lawsuit was as to whether he had more coming or damages in
lieu thereof. This, too, negates any accord. Also of relevance is the fact that the original agreement could not be
"altered or amended except by written agreement." There
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was no written alteration or amendment and therefore the
original agreement was still in effect. The lower court's
determination that there was an accord and satisfaction
was therefore in error.

II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE AGREEMENT OF
JANUARY 22, 1966, WAS "WAIVED AND/OR EXTENDED" BY THE ACTIONS OF THE PARTIES.
Waiver is usually defined as the voluntary relinquishment of a known right. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY, at
1752 (4th ed. 1951). There is no evidence in the record indicating that Petersen voluntarily, or otherwise, relinquished his right to the $20,000.00 loan. Indeed, his
repeated demands, both during and after the year
expired, that the loan be made evidence the contrary
intention. (R. 46-47, 69, 70). There is no indication anywhere in the record that Petersen was waiving his rights
or extending the date for performance. The agreement
provided expressly that time was "of the essence of this
agreement". Performance by January 22, 1967 was critical
to Petersen because of the pressing nature of his financial
obligations and this fact was known to and admitted by
Whiteley. All of these facts support only the conclusion
that Petersen at all times insisted on full and timely performance and none of them support even an inference of
waiver or extension by Petersen. The later conversations
between Petersen and Whiteley quoted in Point I above
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also show that full performance was expected by both
parties even after the breach. Again the requirement that
any alterations or amendments to the agreement be in
writing would preclude any waiver or extension of specific
performance except by a new written agreement. It follows that the lower court's conclusion that specific performance was waived or extended was without support in the
record and therefore in error.
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III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PETERSEN PREVENTED ICC FROM PERFORMING
THE AGREEMENT TO LOAN $20,000.00 by JANUARY
22, 1967 Bl CONTRACTING TO SELL THE WYOMING
PROPERTY TO JAMES S. MILLIRON IN OCTOBER,
1966.

Because of Petersen's pressing need for funds during
1966 and because of the loss he had suffered on the Wyoming property he purchased from ICC (R. 55-57), Petersen
executed a Uniform Real Estate Contract with James S.
Milliron, in October, 1966, under which he agreed to sell
the Wyoming property to Milliron for $67,200.00 with the
balance, after down payment, of $50,200.00 payable in
annual installments over 25 years. No title to the property
was conveyed to Milliron. Petersen was only obligated to
convey title after the contract was paid in full which
would have taken 25 years. ICC's contention is that, as a
matter of law, this contract sale of the Wyoming property
prevented ICC from loaning the $20,000.00 to Petersen
since the $20,000.00 loan was to be secured by a mortgage
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on the Wyoming property. Without any evidence, other
than the contract itself (Exh. 4-D), the lower court found
that Petersen had thereby prevented ICC from performing its agreement to loan the $20,000.00.
The contract sale to Milliron, of course, did not prevent ICC from making the loan to Petersen. Neither
Whiteley nor anyone else connected with ICC even knew
about the sale to Milliron (R. 70) and this obviously did not
prevent his performance. The implication by the lower
court is that the contract sale to Milliron made the Wyoming property unavailable as security for the loan to be
made by ICC. Assuming this to be true, arguendo, Petersen might have provided other security for the loan which
would have satisfied ICC. Whiteley testified that he would
have considered other security for the loan and then displayed an amazing lack of candor when asked if he would
have accepted better security than the Wyoming property.
His response was, "I doubt it." (R. 74). It is obvious from
the testimony of both parties and from the purpose of the
original agreement that the loan of $20,000.00 to Petersen
was the essence of the agreement while the security for
the loan was not. In fact ICC did accept other security for
the $5,000.00 loan when it "partially" performed and made
no request that the Wyoming property be used as security.
(R. 59)

Had Whiteley told Petersen that he had the $20,000.00
and would make the loan as agreed, any problem in ob·
taining the Wyoming property as security would have
been revealed. If other acceptable security could not be
obtained, then Petersen would have had the burden of
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clearing up the problem on the Wyoming property. Still
assuming that the contract sale to Milliron made the property unavailable as security, Petersen could have requested
Milliron to make the property available for this purpose.
The testimony shows that Milliron knew of this need and
had already agreed to it (R. 49, 65). Petersen could have
gone further and repurchased the property from Miiliron
or given him some consideration to make the property
avaiiable as security for the loan from ICC. The point is
that this was Petersen's problem (which he had already
3ol \'ed) and had nothing whatsoever to do with the obligation of I CC. In no conceivable way did this prevent performance by ICC. Whiteley explained that ICC's failure
to perform was only due to its own inability or perhaps, if
he was not can<lirl on this point too, its own unwillingness
and refusal to perform.
The above arguments assume that the contract sale
to Milliron made the Wyo ming property unavailable as
security. The fact is, however, that this contract sale in no
way prevented Petersen from mortgaging the property
to I CC. Title to the property was still in Petersen and
would not have been conveyed to Milliron for 25 years
when the contract was paid in full. The contract contained
the standard clause giving Petersen the "option to secure,
execute and maintain loans secured by said property of
not to exceed the then unpaid contract balance hereunder," which was $50,200.00, well in excess of the contemplated $20,000 loan. It is common practice under these
Uniform Real Estate Contracts for the seller to mortgage
the property sold to banks or other lenders to leverage
I
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already making under the contract and his interest rate
would be no greater than he already agreed to pay. That
purpose doesn't apply in this case since the contemplated
mortgage to ICC would be paid off long before the contract (3 years as opposed to 25 years). Furthermore, should
Milliron decide to payoff his contract and demand a deed
prior to the time Petersen had repaid the mortgage to
ICC, a portion of the repayment could be applied by Petersen to ICC's loan in order to obtain a release of the mortgage and convey clear title to Milliron.
ICC's argument also overlooks the fact that Petersen
could have mortgaged the Wyoming property to ICC even
if this caused him to breach his contract with Milliron.
That, again, is a problem only for Petersen, which he may
or may not be able to resolve with Milliron. In this case he
had already resolved that matter with Milliron. But, had
Petersen not resolved it, Milliron's remedy against Petersen would have been suit for breach of a covenant of their
contract and for damages suffered, if any. That matter
between Milliron and Petersen and the consequences to
Petersen, could have no consequence to ICC. Even assuming Petersen could be required by Milliron to obtain a
release of the mortgage to ICC, that could only work to
the advantage of ICC in getting its loan paid off since it
could refuse to release its mortgage until it was paid in
full. The fact that the performance by A an agreement
with B causes a breach of a separate agreement between
A and C does not prevent the performance of the first
agreement by A. Further, it does not excuse performance
of the first agreement by B. This is certainly the case

where, as here, the ;:,greemen ~ between A and C was mad1
subsequently to the agreement between A and B. It i:
true that some case.:; hold that a contract which is enterer
fm: the purpose of effecting a breach of a prior inconsis1·
ent contract is void and unenforceable by either parts
However, all of these were entered with knowledge of th1
prior inconsistent contract and for the purpose of causini
a breach thereof. 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts Par. 187; Anno
tation, 83 A.L.R. 32. These cases are not authority fo
invalidity of the first agreement. As applied to this casi
if applicable at all, these authorities support the invalidit)
of the later contract oetween Petersen and Milliron sinci
that agreement, so ICC argues, causes the breach of th1
prior inconsistent agreement. Therefore, the Milliror
agreement is void and presents no obstacle to the per
formance of the Petersen-ICC agreement. No authoritiei
have been found, nor could they find any support in logic
which hold the prior agreement unenforceable by reasor
of the later inconsistent agreement.
The Wyoming property was available as security fo1
a loan from ICC at all times during the year specified ir
the agreement and thereafter until it was obvious that
ICC was not going to perform. Title to the Property wa:
not conveyed until May 5, 1967, one month after Whitele)
had refused to make the loan in response to the demani
from Petersen's attorney. The contract sale to Milliror
still left $50,200.00 equity in the property to secure !
$20,000.00 loan. ICC had available all the security it needei
and bargained for. It was not "prevented" or excuse!
from performance by the contract sale to Milliron and tbi
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lowe1· court's holding to thif; effect should be re\'ersed.

THE LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE CONCLUDED
THAT ICC BREACHED ITS AGREEMENT TO LOAN
$20,000.00 TO PETERSEN BY JANUARY 22, 1967, OR
THEREAFTER, AND SHOULD HAVE AWARDED THE
RESULTING DAMAGES.
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The Lower Court dismissed Petersen's complaint for
;Jreach of the agreement to loan $20,000.00 to Petersen
apparently on the basis of its determination that the
$5,000.00 loan was an accord and satisfaction, that specific
performance had been waived or extended and that Petersen "prevented" ICC from performing. Points I, II and III
above show that the court was in error in making these
determinations and therefore its dismissal of Petersen's
complaint has no basis.
The facts necessary to establish Petersen's cause of
action are clearly admitted in ICC's Answer and in the
evidence. 'l'he agreement of ICC to loan $20,000.00 to Petersen by January 22, 1967 and the failure to perform that
agreement are admitted in the Answer (R. 3). The evirlence of both parties shows a breach of the contract.
Petersen introduced substantial evidence of loss and
damage to him directly resulting from ICC's breach of
the agreement. ICC produced nothing to controvert any
of this. The evidence shows direct cash losses of $19,300.00
from the necessity to discount thn Milliron contract to
raise cash and of $10,000.00 from loss of Petersen's dairy
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equipment business. Tht: evidence and exhibits further
showed damage to Petersen's credit for which further
amounts should be awarded. Of course, the $5,000 loan by
ICC to Petersen should be offaet against these damages
and the balance awar<lf'd to Petersen as net damages
resulting from breach of the agreement by ICC. Since this
evidence is before this court, the order reversing the lower
court's judgment should include directions to award
damages in accordance with the above evidence.
It should ~e pointed out that Petersen had already
suffered his damages prior to May 12, 1967 when the
$5,000.00 loan was made. A loan of $20,000.00 by January
22, 1967 would have prevented these damages. The evidence and exhibits indicate that the weeks following
January 22, 1967 were the most difficult for Petersen.
Finally, in hopes of pressuring ICC into performing its
agreement to help Petersen out of his financial difficulty,
he had his attorney send a demand letter to ICC on April
5, 1967. This produced an immediate reaction from
Whiteley but no loan and no promise of a loan in the ne~r
future. The funds still were not available, according to
Whiteley. It was obvious to Petersen that ICC was not
going to perform its agreement. He had heard that same
story from Whiteley for a year. He had no choice but to
find some other means out of his difficulty and the dis·
count of the contract to Milliron for cash, and the consequent loss to him, was the only means available to him.
Whiteley's belated decision to loan $5,000.00 to Petersen
on May 12, 1967, after Petersen's loss had occured, was
too little and too late to prevent the consequences of his
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breach. HP,, of course, admitted having knowledge of
Petersen's desperate financial situation and could therefore have foreseen the consequences of his breach. In view
of all this Petersen \Vas certainly justified in withhholding
repayment of the $5,000.00 loan until ICC had responded
for the damages which it caused.
CONCLUSION
The lower court made several findings of fact that
find no support in the evidence. Many of the conclusions
of law find no support in the findings of fact. All of these
were challenged by Petersen in his motion to amend the
findings and conclusions. The lower court summarily
refused to make any amendments even though a cursory
reading of the transcript shows the obvious error in the
findings and conclusions. This brief has considered only
those errors considered most detrimental and basic to the
judgment of the lower court.
The record contains no evidence supporting the conclusion that an accord was agreed to by Petersen and ICC.
There was no offer, no acceptance and no consideration.
An accord is a new agreement which must contain all the
basic elements necessary to support a contract. None of
that appears here and in fact all the evidence shows that
both parties were looking to the original agreement even
after the alleged accord and satisfaction took place. Much
of the same evidence clearly establishes that there was no
voluntary, or otherwise, relinquishment of a known right
by Petersen. Therefore, there could be no waiver or extension of specific performance of the agreement. Since the
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agreement expressly provided that alterations or amend.
ments must be in writing, the alleged accord and satisfac.
tion and waiver or extension would be of no effect anyway.
Further, the contract sale by Petersen to Milliron in no
way prevented Petersen from using the Wyoming property as security for the loan from I CC. Petersen still had
title to the property, his agreement with Milliron allowed
such a mortgage, Milliron was aware of and had consented
to the mortgage, and even a breach of that contract by
Petersen would not prevent Petersen from mortgaging
the property to ICC. This in no way excused performance
by ICC. Whiteley's own testimony proves that his failure
to perform was either ICC's inability or unwillingness to
perform and was not related to any action of Petersen.
ICC had the burden of proof on all of these matters and
has failed to carry that burden. Therefore, the lower
court's judgment should be reversed with directions to
enter judgment in favor of Petersen and award damages
in accordance with the evidence.
Respectfully submitted,
BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLARK
By:

Ralph J. Marsh

